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I. INTRODUCTION
In November, 1967, the Securities and Exchange Commission (here-
inafter cited as the SEC or Commission) announced the formation of a
small internal study group under the direction of Commissioner Francis
M. Wheat. The Commission's action in initiating this study was prompted
in part by a growing dissatisfaction with the operation of the disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act of 19331 and the failure of that Act,
as currently interpreted and administered by the Commission, to provide
a meaningful degree of certainty and predictability in its application.
In establishing the Study Group, the Commission stated that its purpose
would be to "inquire into means for improving the administration and
enforcement of the disclosure requirements of the [1933 and 1934] Acts
and dissemination to the investing public of information material to
investment decisions."2 In April 1969, the Commission's Study Group
released what is currently referred to as the Wheat Report.8
Due to the modest size of the Study Group,4 the Wheat Report
deals only with a limited area of federal securities regulation and does
not cover various specialized aspects of disclosure policy, such as dis-
closures required by the Investment Company Act, the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, or the Trust Indenture Act. Furthermore, the
Wheat Report does not deal with those questions which have recently
* Member, Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor,
Freshman Research and Writing.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (1964) [hereinafter cited as the Securities Act or the 1933
Act].
2. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4885 (Nov. 29, 1967).
3. SEC DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (CCH 1969) [hereinafter cited as the Wheat Report].
4. For a portion of the last fourteen months, five persons were involved full time in
the work of the Study; for the balance of that period, four persons were so engaged. One
member of the Commission's staff acted as a senior adviser to the Study and others con-
tributed assistance in particular areas.
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excited great interest, such as the obligation of the so-called "insiders"
to make appropriate disclosures of unpublished material information in
connection with their purchases and sales of securities. Instead, the
primary goals of the study were:
to discover what could be done through the rule-making pro-
cess-
(a) to enhance the degree of coordination between the
disclosures required by the '33 and "34 Acts;
(b) to respond to the call for greater certainty and pre-
dictability; and
(c) to develop a consistent interpretive pattern which
would help to assure that appropriate disclosures are made
prior to the creation of interstate public markets in the secur-
ities of any issuer.'
Fully recognizing the Study Group's emphasis on the importance of
amplifying the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934' and integrating them with the regulations of the 1933 Act, it
seems to lawyers in the Securities field, that Chapter VI, entitled
Secondary Distributions and Brokers' Transactions, is the heart of the
Wheat Report. Chapter VI proposes "definitional rules" dealing in the
main with resales by persons who have purchased securities "from the
issuer or from a controlling person" in so-called "private placements."
These rules are at variance with long-standing interpretations of statu-
tory language 7 under which an "investment-intent" on the part of the
purchaser, coupled with a limited number of offerees, has provided the
basis for a private offering exemption. According to these traditional
interpretations, resales by such a purchaser have been permissible only
after some indeterminate lapse of time or if and when the purchaser is
fortunate enough to experience a "change of circumstances."
It is the purpose of this article to state the existing law with regard
to the resale of privately placed securities and then to consider the pro-
posals in Chapter VI of the Wheat Report. Special emphasis will be
given to the doctrines of "investment intent" and "change of circum-
stances" to show the state of confusion which precipitated the need
for the new rules.
II. THE STATE OF CONFUSION
A. The Private Placement Exemption
The Securities Act of 1933 is generally identified with the registra-
tion of securities with the SEC and the attendant disclosure for primary
and secondary offerings. The legislative purpose behind the registration
5. Wheat Report, at 8.
6. 15 U.S.C. 78(a)-(jj) (1964) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act or the 1934
Act].
7. See Wheat Report, at 152.
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requirement was to protect the investing public through the disclosures
and by creating certain liabilities for a noncomplying registration or
distribution (but not the trading) of securities. The important thing -that
Congress had in mind was to make sure that, in the future, the public
should have free access to all relevant financial information concerning
the great numbers of securities that each year were coming onto the
market."
When Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, an exemption
from registration was placed in the second clause of section 4(1) [now
section 4(2)] for "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering."9 That is, "privately placed" securities were excused from
registration. This exemption, was not thought by anyone to be significant;
at most it was believed that only a relatively few securities would be
so issued, and those to persons already fully conversant with the issuer's
business.'0 But the exemption, "insignificant" in 1933, soon took on
substantial proportions. During the next four years, 1934-1937, securities
with an aggregate value of more than a billion dollars were issued with-
out registration." Under this exemption which was designed for an
"isolated sale to a particular person," $10.1 billion of securities were
sold for cash in 2,613 private offerings during the three calendar years
1951, 1953 and 1955.12 With the increase in its use, the exemption became
more and more controversial and doubts arose as to what constituted a
"private offering" vis a vis a "public offering."
Much of the controversy arose because the Securities Act had no
description of what constituted a "public offering."'" Nor did the legis-
lative history throw much meaning on the term used in section 4(1).
The House report merely states that it "exempts transactions .. .to
permit an issuer to make a specific or an isolated sale of its securities to
a particular person," but required "that if a sale of the issuer's securities
should be made generally to the public that the transaction shall come
within the purview of the Act."' 4 A later House and Senate Conference
8. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1) (1964). The text of Section 77(d)(1), relating to exempted
transactions, reads in part as follows: "The provisions of Section 77(e) of this title [which
provides generally for registration] shall not apply to any of the following transactions:
(1) Transactions by any person other than an insurer, underwriter, or dealer; transactions
by an issuer not involving any public offering; .... "
10. There was a dearth of comment as to the scope of the exemption when the act
was being debated. Arthur H. Dean, in a general discussion said merely that: "Transactions
between private persons, not with a view to public offering, are exempt." Fortune, Aug.
1933, at 55.
11. 26 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 244 (1960); 1960 MOODY'S IND. MANUAL, Special Features
Section, at 19.
12. SEC, CosT Or FLOTATION OF CORPORATE SEcuRrrus 1951-1955, at 25 (1957).
13. The term came up in United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
it being a government contention that the Securities Act referred to "one general offering
for only a limited period. ... "
14. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Seas. 15, 16 (1933). See also S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
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report contains the following language: "Sales of stock to stockholders
become subject to the Act unless the stockholders are so small in number
that the sale to them does not constitute a public offering."' 1 Congress,
however, did not draw a line at the illusive point where a transaction
creases to be private and becomes a public offering. At the time the 1933
Act became law, there was nothing to suggest that private placements
were ever made to more than a few persons; and nothing whatever to
indicate that Congress considered the possibility that in the next quarter
century, such placements might be made in an amount aggregating over
fifty billion dollars.'6
Nevertheless, the private offering exemption provided a means to
escape the publicity and burdens of registration, and the financial com-
munity was not slow to take advantage of it. Counsel for the Commission
was soon called on to give a comprehensive opinion in the matter. In
his view-and his opinion has set Commission policy since-the scope
of the exemption was "essentially a question of fact,"' 7 in which a number
of circumstances were pertinent; for example: the number of offerees;
their relationship to each other; the number of units offered; and the
type and size of the offering.
The Commissioner's construction of the section 4(1) exemption
was by no means unwelcome to investors who found they could easily
tailor operations to come within the exemption. However, those selling
under the exemption came against another grey area which was to prove
most troublesome in future years. Even though all other conditions were
satisfied, the exemption was lost if the purchaser took "with a view to
distribution." The reason for this is that the 1933 Act defines "under-
writer" as a "person who has purchased ... with a view to,... or sells
... in connection with, the distribution of any security.... .' 8 The require-
ment that the purchase be for investment and not with a view to distrib-
ution 0 i.e., a purchaser with "investment intent", is quite logical. Its
purpose is to prevent private sales from being converted into public
distributions by using the original purchasers as conduits. 20 Not so
logical, however, was the fact that "investment intent" was not defined
by the 1933 Act or any rule of the Commission in terms of a definite
holding period. In short, even if a company used the "private placement"
exemption, investors were sure to ask: "How long do I have to hold?"
15. H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933).
16. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1952). The Committee's conclusion on H.R.
2508, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), was that: "The Congress therefore could not have fore-
seen the developments to date when tremendous bond offerings amounting to billions of
dollars each year, and totalling over 22 billion dollars since 1934, are not being registered."
Id.
17. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(11) (1964).
19. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
20. See Crowell-Coller Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12,
1957).
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Until the Wheat Report, no one could give the answer to this logical
question.21
B. The Holding Period
Minimally, it seems today that a private offering can be undertaken
if the securities sold are purchased by an investor who signs an invest-
ment letter representing that: (1) he is holding for investment; (2) that
the securities are marked with a legend which specifically and clearly
states that they are not free stock but were sold pursuant to such invest-
ment representation; and (3) if the issuer notifies the transfer agent and
gives specific instructions not to permit transfer of the securities unless
an SEC "no-action" letter is obtained or an opinion of competent counsel
states that the securities are free for sale. Translating all of this in terms
of section 4(2), an issuer when making a private offering, must make
sure that the securities sold do not get back into the stream of commerce
for at least a period consonant with an investment intention, and incon-
sonant with an intention to make a distribution.
Many different holding periods with a spread between six months
and five years have been suggested, but none could be given with any
assurance. The SEC recognizes no fixed time period between purchase
and sale as establishing an investment intent, although it does acknowl-
edge that the passing of time is an important factor.22 Certainly the con-
cept of "purchase for investment" never included any holding period
analogous to the six months required under the Internal Revenue Code
to establish long term gains. Until a few years ago, a one-year rule of
thumb had evolved among the securities-law bar. In a 1938 opinion of
General Counsel he expressed the view that retention of the securities
for as long as a year would "create a strong inference that they had been
purchased for investment. ' 2' He added, however, that even such an
inference would fall, for example, "in the face of evidence of a prearranged
scheme to effect a distribution at the end of the year."
2 4
The Commission's most elaborate exposition of the resale problem
under the private offering exemption resulted from the sale of $4 million
of convertible debentures by Crowell-Collier Publishing Company in
1955 and 1956. In its opinion in the Crowell-Collier case 25 the Commis-
sion observed that "holding for a year, does not afford a statutory basis
for an exemption . . . . Other pronouncements on this subject by the
Commission and its staff furnish little additional information. For
example, in the Crowell-Collier release and the Second Circuit's decision
21. See Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform of Federal Securities Regulations, 23
VAND. L. REv. 495, 504 (1970).
22. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
23. Op. Gen. Counsel, SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 13, 1938).
24. Id.
25. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825, at 7 (Aug.
12, 1957).
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in the related case of Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC,6 it was stipulated
that a ten-month holding period did not preclude a finding of intent to
distribute. Subsequently, former Chairman Cohen (then Commissioner)
remarked that a presumption of investment intent might arise after a
two-year holding period. One author clearly indicated, however, that
certain kinds of factual situations would negate any such presumption,
despite the period of holding."
In United States v. Sherwood,2" the Court stated that the presence of
a two-year holding period was "an insuperable obstacle" 9 to finding an
intent to distribute. Sherwood, however, was a criminal contempt case
in which the Government had the burden of establishing distributive
intent beyond a reasonable doubt. In the normal case, where the seller
has the burden of establishing his investment intent by a preponderance
of the evidence, the Sherwood case would not be of much value. Another
opinion on the subject by an experienced private practitioner demonstrates
still another viewpoint as to the length of the holding period.
As a practical matter, the shares may... be sold in any manner
after the lapse of a sufficient amount of time, the period being
rather indefinite but probably two to three years. For the
record, however, it is official dogma that if stock is acquired for
investment, a lapse of time (no matter how long) does not auto-
matically free the stock from restrictions on resale.8 °
Finally, in certain cases, the Commission has advised investors who
held privately placed debt securities that resale could be made only
after five years.8 ' From the foregoing, it is difficult to see how a resale
could ever be made with safety except in the event of a no-action letter
or some personal disaster such as death or bankruptcy. 2
Because of the lack of any fixed holding period or reliable rule of
thumb, purchasers who sign letters of investment intent have been
responsible for the great bulk of the interpretative requests and requests
for "no action" letters received by the Division of Corporate Finance.83
Present interpretations are keyed to the necessity of asserting, and then
demonstrating, a state of mind on the part of the private purchasers. The
test for claiming an exemption from the registration requirements is
subjective. Since direct evidence of the seller's intent is rarely available,
26. 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4248 (July 14,
1960), in which the Commission, in its proposed rule 155, declined to adopt any prima fade
holding period preceding the sale of underlying securities received upon conversion.
27. SEC, PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS, 30, 31
(C. Isreals ed. 1962).
28. 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
29. Id. at 483.
30. Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Federal Securities Laws-A Program for Reform,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1323, 1337 (1968) (emphasis added).
31. Wheat Report, at 165.
32. I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 165 (2d ed. 1961).
33. Wheat Report, at 156.
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appearances have formed the basis for controlling inferences. The hold-
ing period will support or negate an investment intent depending on two
factors: circumstances at the time of purchase and intervening changes
in circumstances ("Change of circumstances" doctrine).
C. Change Of Circumstances
Regardless of the emphasis given to the period of holding, the Com-
mission has long conceded that an unforeseen and unforeseeable "mate-
rial" change of circumstances, either in the situation of the security
purchaser or of the issuer, may release a purchaser at any time from
his commitment. This concession is based on the theory that such a
change justifies the inference of a change of a proper intent previously
existing.34 It is not every change of circumstances, however, which is
effective. Among the changes which the Commission does not consider
sufficient are these: (1) any change reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the purchase, e.g., heavy expenditures needed in the purchaser's busi-
ness; (2) change induced by the purchaser's own conduct, as for instance,
purchase of any expensive home requiring liquidation of the investment
to gain funds for the down payment or need to sell the security to pay
off a loan incurred on its purchase; or (3) change in the general fortunes
of the issuer, as, for instance, losses, decline in the market, or loss of an
important account.
Among the changes considered sufficient are: (1) unforeseen serious
illness in the purchaser's family resulting in large medical expenses; (2)
a radical change in the nature of the issuers business, e.g., a change from
the mining of coal to the manufacture of electric parts; or (3) nearly
complete turnover in the management of the issuer.35
Tying this in with the holding period requirement, the substantiality
of the required "change of circumstances" varies directly with the length
of time between purchase and sale. As stated by one commentator, "pru-
dent counsel would prefer to see the passage of at least two years as
partial basis for his opinion that sale may be made because of a change
in circumstances which was not contemplated at the time the security
was originally acquired." 6
Once again, rules which give certainty and predictability have not
materialized. The "change in circumstances" doctrine has instead been
decided on a case by case basis.
III. THE THEORY BEHIND THE PROPOSED RULES
The Supreme Court in the Ralston PurinaI case stated that the
question of whether an offering constitutes a public offering or is exempt
34. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
35. See Isreals, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. Rv.
851 (1959); Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. Rv.
869 (1959).
36. WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC (C. Isreals & G. Duff, Jr., eds. 1962) at 15.
37. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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from registration as a private offering turns "on the need of the offerees
for the protections afforded by registration." ' Where the offerees are
not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration
would disclose, compliance with section 5 of the Securities Act is required.
Both the "change of circumstances" doctrine and the holding requirement
arose from the need to find ways of deterring the flow of securities from
issuers to the public without registration, yet both concepts are non-
functional in that they bear no relation to the needs of investors. In
order to lay the framework for a functional disclosure system, the Study
Group first had to resolve the question: under what circumstances do
investors need the protection of registration when securities held by a
controlling person are sold, or when securities sold privately by the
issuer are resold?
Reporting vs. Non-Reporting Companies
It was concluded in the Wheat Report that the best answer to this
question could be found by drawing a distinction between companies
which file regular reports of their affairs with the Commission under
sections 13"9 or 15(d)40 of the 1934 Act ("reporting companies") and
companies which do not file such reports ("non-reporting companies").
Under this system, if there is not full disclosure of a company's business,
earnings, and financial condition (or if the company is a reporting com-
pany and its reports appear to be out of date), a sale to the public of that
company's securities ought to be accompanied by the disclosures
afforded by registration under the 1933 Act. On the other hand, if a
company has registered a class of its securities with the Commission under
the 1934 Act, and is keeping current the information in the original
registration statement through up-to-date periodic reports to the Com-
mission, then it ought to be possible to permit secondary sales of its
securities to the public without the filing of 1933 Act registration state-
ment. There would be exceptions in the latter case:
(1) where the quantity of those securities to be sold exceed
the amount which the trading market normally could be ex-
pected to absorb within a reasonable period of time, or
(2) where, in order to move the securities from private
into public hands, arrangements for the solicitation of buying
38. Id. at 127.
39. Section 13 of the Exchange Act requires a listed company to keep reasonably
current, the information contained in the application for registration and to file annual
and periodic reports. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (1964).
40. Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, until recently only required annual and periodic
reports of companies which had registered, under the Securities Act of 1933, securities of a
class aggregating more than two million dollars, however, under the 1964 amendments,
reports are required of any company that offers its securities under a registration statement
so long as it has 300 holders of the class of security offered. Exchange Act 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(o)(d) (1964).
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customers, or selling incentives exceeding the commissions paid
in ordinary trading transactions, are required.41
The central policy embodied in the proposed rules is that exemptions
from 1933 Act registration should be interpreted, not only in light of the
character and extent of the disclosures already made by the issuer of
securities, but also in light of the selling effort which can reasonably be
anticipated.
IV. SCOPE OF THE RULES
As mentioned earlier, under the proposed rules answers to the
questions of how long the purchaser in a private placement must hold
and in what manner he may sell are dependent on whether he purchased
securities in a reporting or nonreporting company. The answers are also
dependent on whether he is a control42 or noncontrol person.
From these variables the possible questions are as follows:
1. When may a control person sell investment stock in a reporting
company?
2. When may a noncontrol person sell investment stock in a report-
ing company?
3. When may a control person sell investment stock in a nonreport-
ing company?
4. When may a noncontrol person sell stock in a non-reporting
company?
At first blush the answers appear simple. The control person in a
reporting company may sell specifically limited quantities in ordinary
brokerage transactions at the end of one year4" and the noncontrol person
in the reporting company is afforded the same treatment." The control
person in a nonreporting company may never sell,45 while the noncontrol
person in a reporting company may sell all of his securities at the end
of five years."
In order to analyze these answers, three key definitions in the
proposed rules must be considered. They are:
(1) rule 162 which defines the term "distribution;"
(2) rule 161 which defines the term "restricted security;" and
(3) rule 163 which defines the term "underwriter."
41. Wheat Report, at 187.
42. The Wheat Report did not clarify the conditions under which a person would or
would not be deemed to be in control. On the problem of control, see Enstan and Kamen,
Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAw 289 (1968); Sommer, Who's "In
Control"-SEC., 21 Bus. LAw 559 (1966).
43. Proposed rule 162(a) 3, 4, 34 Fed. Reg. 14229 (1969).
44. Id.
45. See Wheat Report, at 25.
46. Proposed rule 161 (b), 34 Fed. Reg. 14230 (1969).
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V. DEFINITIONS
A. Distribution
Paragraph (b) of proposed rule 162 defines distribution as any
public offering of a security unless specified requirements are met. In
substance, these requirements provide that restricted securities of a
reporting company which have been held for one year, may be sold with-
out registration, in specified limited quantities in ordinary brokerage
transactions.
The definition of "distribution" is consistent with the theory that if
there has been no disclosure of a company's financial condition then a
sale to the public of that company's securities ought to be registered while
a company which has already registered a class of its securities and files
up to date reports of its financial condition, ought to be able to sell
securities to the public without registration. For example:
(1) Nonpublic transactions are excluded from the term "dis-
tribution" and do not require registration of the securities
involved; (2) any public offering of the securities of an issuer
which is not subject to appropriate reporting requirements is
a "distribution", and (3) a public offering of the securities of
an issuer which is subject to the reporting requirements and is
not delinquent in its filings is not a "distribution" . . . if the
amounts involved and the method of sale are consistent with
ordinary trading. ' 4 7
Objective tests were needed to determine what sales were "consistent
with ordinary trading" and therefore, for purposes of predictability and
certainty, the Study, for the most part, adopted present day rule 15448 to
deal with the quantity limitations. That rule was designed to separate
routine trading transactions from transactions involving the disposition
of a large block of securities by means of extra-selling incentives. Basic-
ally, within the limits of rule 154, a broker may effect casual sales for a
control person, through normal brokerage transactions, provided he is not
an underwriter to the stock sold.4 In computing the quantitative limits,
the amount covered by the sell order is added to all other sales made by
or attributed to"' the control person within the preceding six months. If
47. Wheat Report, at 189, 190.
48. Rule 154(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1970) [promulgated in SEC Securities Act
Release No. 3421 (Aug. 2 1951) and renumbered 154(c) by SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3525 (Dec. 22 1954)].
49. Rule 154 merely defines the brokers exemptions of §4(4) of the Exchange Act;
the seller must find his own exemption. When the seller is not an underwriter and the
proscribed selling effort is not present, his part in the transaction is exempt under § 4(1).
In any event, the broker is under an obligation to inquire as to whether the seller is
engaged in a distribution or is an underwriter.
50. Sales by persons affiliated with the control person or by their donees may have to
be included in determining the availability of the rule. SEC Securities Act Release No.
4669 (Feb. 17, 1964).
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this total does not exceed one percent of the issuer's outstanding stock,
a sale of over-the-counter stock, will not be deemed a distribution. In
the case of listed stock, if the total does not exceed the lesser of the one
percent rule mentioned above or the largest weekly volume of trading
within any one of the four calendar weeks preceding the receipt of the
sell order by the broker, the sale is not deemed a distribution.
The basis of the limitations represent the Commission's estimate of
what the market can absorb without resort to the proscribed selling
effort since the essence of distribution is selling effort. If selling effort is
present in a Rule 154 transaction, the broker loses his Section 4(4)
exemption and comes within the terms of Section 2 (11) as a seller for a
control person. The basic quantity limitations of Rule 154 were retained
with the following changes: (1) private placements of securities within
the preceding six months do not reduce the quantity which may other-
wise be sold; (2) only those members of a carefully defined family group
are considered together as one "person" for purposes of the quantity
limitation; (3) sales may be made in successive six-month periods; (4) in-
quiry by the broker of other bona fide broker dealers is not prohibited; (5)
the broker involved is permitted to remain in the "sheets" if acting as a
genuine market maker; and (6) commission limits are specified by ref-
erence to the minimum commission required by the exchange on which
the security is listed and, for over-the-counter securities, by reference to
the minimum New York Exchange commission schedule.5 '
The new definition gives equal treatment to securities sold on behalf
of controlling persons and to securities acquired in private placements.
In each case, the purchaser of the securities, after holding for one year, is
permitted to resell in unsolicited transactions, limited amounts of a se-
curity purchased in a private placement, as discussed above. However,
this provision is only available if the security is that of a reporting com-
pany; i.e., a company, which because of compliance with Section 5 of the
1933 Act or with Sections 12 (g) or 15(d) of the 1934 Act, has registered
the security and is filing periodic annual reports with the Commission.
Under proposed rule 164, the identity of such companies would be kept
current through maintenance by the Commission of a "qualified list."52
Because of the equal treatment afforded control and noncontrol persons,
a present anomaly created by Commission Rule 154 will no longer exist.
No longer will a controlling shareholder of a corporation be able to sell
securities worth several million dollars which he acquired in the market
without registration, whereas a supervisory employee who purchased and
signed an "investment letter" for 100 shares a year ago in an unregistered
employees' stock purchase plan, would be advised he could not sell his
shares through his broker.
51. Wheat Report, at 21.
52. Proposed rule 164, 34 Fed. Reg. 14231 (1969).
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B. Restricted Security
A restricted security is defined in proposed rule 161 to mean "any
security acquired directly or indirectly from its issuer, or an affiliate of
its issuer in a transaction or chain of transactions none of which was a
public offering or other public disposition.""3 In short, any person who
disposes of a "restricted security" in a distribution would be an "under-
writer" and underwriter transactions are not exempt from registration
under the 1933 Act.
An important question considered by the Study Group was whether
the prohibition on the sale of securities by private purchasers should
continue indefinitely, subject only to further private placements, to re-
sales under Regulation A, 4 and in the case of reporting companies, to
the limitations of proposed Rule 162 (already discussed). At least one
commentator has indicated that the prohibition on public resale of any
securities originally taken in a private placement should continue in-
definitely.5
The Study Group, however, viewing perpetual restraints on aliena-
tion with disfavor, determined the restrictions should last for a definite
period of years after which the securities would be free of restrictions
on resales. The Study Group suggested a five year period. However, in
order to prevent circumvention of the rules through the employment of
shell corporations, and to insure that the issuer has an active business,
one qualification was placed on the five-year rule. The proposed rule re-
quires that the issuer have annual gross revenues of at least $250,000
from the conduct in the ordinary course of its business during four of
the five years since issuance or purchase from a control person. 6
The five year requirement, as well as the gross revenue test, merit
further comment. To begin with, the selection of the five year require-
ment was completely arbitrary. Furthermore, when evaluated in con-
nection with the new provision that any non-private sale of securities of
a non-reporting company will constitute a distribution, the five year re-
quirement appears to be unreasonably long. It also appears unreasonably
long in light of the fact that, although there is no set holding period,
securities attorneys felt relatively sure that immunity came to a private
purchaser after a lapse of possibly two years and that such a holding
period could be shortened by a change in the investor's circumstances.
It is not surprising, therefore, that one commentator has already rec-
ommended that the "restricted period" be limited to three years.5 7 It
should be noted, however, that the proposed rules take effect prospec-
53. Proposed rule 161(a), 34 Fed. Reg. 14229 (1969).
54. Securities are "qualified" for sale to the public by compliance with provisions of
SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 251-63 (1964).
55. Cohen, Truth in Securities RevLsted, 79 lTARV. L. REV. 1340, 1404 (1966).
56. Proposed rule 161 (c), 34 Fed. Reg. 14229 (1969).
57. See Throop, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee Comments on the Wheat
Report, 25 Bus. LAw. 39, 46 (1969).
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tively58 and therefore the holder of securities acquired in a private place-
ment prior to the effective date of the new rules, may resell without
registration at whatever time and under whatever circumstances resales
would previously have been permitted. Also, in the interest of a consistent
policy for the protection of public investors in all secondary securities
transactions, the revised rule would not permit sale without registration
of control stock of a nonreporting company.
As was mentioned earlier, the restricted security becomes unre-
stricted after five years from issuance or purchase from a controlling
person, only if the issuer meets the gross revenue test. The other qualifi-
cations in the proposed rules have as their basis, logically enough, the
status of the issuer as a reporting or non-reporting company as well as
".. . the need of the offerees for the protection afforded by registration.""
The gross revenue test, however, bears no relationship to the above
criteria and directs itself solely to the size of the issuer's operations. In
this way, the test could operate to prohibit the resale of securities with-
out registration, even though a company operates in good faith and even
though the company appears on the rule 164 Qualified List. Also, the
test could, in certain situations, be unduly harsh on the noncontrol per-
son. A situation could occur, for example, in which a nonreporting com-
pany fails to have a gross revenue of $250,000 in one of the last four
years. In this event, the noncontrol person is not free to sell until there
are at least four consecutive $250,000 gross revenue years. However, the
same shareholder (noncontrol) in a reporting company, even if the com-
pany is losing money, is free to sell within the confines of the quantity
limitations in proposed rule 162.
Finally, the gross revenue test appears to take on the characteristic
of "Blue Sky" legislation since it tends to control the quality of securities
being offered to the public, 0 instead of confining itself to the purpose of
adequate disclosure laid down by the Securities Act of 1933.
C. Underwriter
Proposed Rule 160 defines an underwriter as a person who par-
ticipates or is connected with a "distribution" of "restricted" securities.
Once again, subjectivity is replaced by an objective test, since the com-
ponents, "distribution" and "restricted securities", have been defined by
other rules.
At the present time the law dealing with statutory underwriters de-
pends in large part on investment intent. Briefly stated the law and the
problem presented are as follows. Section 5, the heart of the Securities Act
of 1933, makes it unlawful for any person to use the mails or any means
of interstate commerce to sell a security for which a registration is not
58. Wheat Report, at 217.
59. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1952).
60. On the subject of "Blue Sky" legislation, see SowARis, COMMENTS, CASES AND
MATERiALS ON SEcuRiTiEs REGuLATION 3, 12 (1966).
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in effect."' Section 4(1), however, exempts from Section 5, "transactions
by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer." 2 Assuming
for purposes of this analysis that the control persons are not issuers or
dealers, the only question raised deals with the underwriter category.
Section 11 provides the statutory answer.
[T]he term "underwriter" means any person who has pur-
chased from an issuer with a view to, or offers, or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or
participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such
undertaking, ... 63
The definition of underwriter includes not only the professional un-
derwriter who may be thought of as part of the machinery of public
distribution, but also includes any person who takes from a controlling
stockholder with "a view to distribution." Whether the purchaser took the
securities "with a view" to their subsequent "distribution" is determined
by his intent at the time of purchase.
In order to eliminate the subjective factor of intent the proposed
rule removes the emphasis given to the phrase "has purchased from an
issuer with a view to . . . ." in section 2(11) in the 1933 Act and instead,
the proposed rule incorporates the following precise definition:
or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the dis-
tribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or in-
direct participation in any such undertaking, or participates or
has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any
such undertaking; .... 64
No longer will it be necessary to prove that a person lacked invest-
ment intent in order to find that he is an underwriter of securities if it
can be shown that he has disposed of restricted securities in a distribu-
tion. A person holding securities originally sold by the issuer or by a
controlling person in a nonpublic offering need only show that his sales,
whenever occurring, did not amount to "distributions," and that the
securities he sold, at the time of sale, were no longer restricted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the proposals in the Wheat Report, the question "How
long must I hold?" may finally be answered. The effect of the possible
answer is two-fold. First, investors who purchase securities in a private
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964). The Securities Act requires that each distribution be
registered; consequently the mere fact that the security has already been registered by the
issuer will not release the nonissuer of his duty to register. See I L. Loss, SECURITIES REoU-
LATIONS 297 & n.98 (2d ed. 1961).
62. 78 Stat. 65 (1964), amending 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) 1 (1958).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 77(6) 11 (1958) (emphasis added).
64. Wheat Report, at 203 (emphasis added).
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placement would be assured that they would not be locked in for an
indefinite period of time. Second, organizers of a venture whose needs
dictate the private placement methods of financing could approach pros-
pective investors armed with an unequivocal answer to the much asked
question.
In their attempt to see the "whole of disclosure" through examina-
tion of its parts, the Study Group weighed fairly the many interests
involved. The solutions proposed are well-reasoned and will make a tre-
mendous contribution to the area of securities regulation.
